Descriptive models of the EU political space are fundamental components of both descriptions of EU politics and theories of EU policy making. But there is no consensus on which, if any, model accurately captures the EU political space. In this article, the authors seek to advance their understanding of the EU political space by bringing evidence to bear on the accuracy of four extant models. Following the methodology used to analyze the national political space of European democracies, they assemble and code manifestos of party federations written prior to European elections. They then use confirmatory factor analysis to analyze the underlying structure of these party federations' policy positions. They also examine temporal differences in party federation positions over several sets of issues. The results of the study indicate that the EU political space is basically one dimensional and similar to the domestic Left-Right dimension in policy content. describe, scholars of EU policy making have adopted conflicting assumptions about the dimensionality and character of the EU policy space. Because the shape of the political space-the number of dimensions, the policy content of these dimensions, and the location of actors in this space-is a central determinant of political competition and outcomes, these conflicting assumptions often lead to different conclusions about and interpretations of EU policy making. This is a serious impediment to advancing our theoretical understanding of EU politics. A resolution of this theoretical conflict depends on assessing the relative value of the conflicting assumptions about the character of the policy space. 
To help address this problem, we attempt to examine empirically whether the structure of EU political space is consistent with these existing models of the EU political space. Specifically, we investigate whether the models described by Marks and Steenbergen (2002) account for the EU policy space as defined by the European party federations-or Euro-parties. These Europarties bring together the domestic and European-level political elites in the four main European party families-Socialists, Christian Democrats/Conservatives, Liberals, and Greens. In the European elections of 1979, 1984, 1989, 1994, and 1999 , the Euro-parties drafted manifestos describing their positions across a broad range of policies involving the EU. We use an established content analysis technique to turn these text documents into numerical data representing Euro-parties' positions on specific issues. Through confirmatory factor analysis, we then examine whether these policy positions are related in ways consistent with existing models of the EU political space. Finally, we describe how the positions of the Euro-parties in the EU political space have changed during the past 20 years.
THE SHAPE OF THE EU POLICY SPACE:
FOUR RIVAL MODELS Marks and Steenbergen (2002) describe four extant models of the EU policy space: the international relations model, the regulation model, the HixLord model, and the Hooghe-Marks model. To examine the empirical accuracy of these models of the EU political space, we adopt a common analytical approach in the empirical study of the political space in national contexts (e.g., Budge, Klingemann, Volkens, Bara, & Tanenbaum, 2001; Budge, Robertson, & Hearl, 1987b; Gabel & Huber, 2000) . A traditional approach to characterizing a policy space is to describe its dimensionality, where dimensions represent constraint on the policy positions of political actors. For example, to understand the political space of a national party competition, scholars examine how parties' positions on a variety of salient policy questions are interrelated (e.g., Budge et al., 1987b Laver, 2001) . A dimension reduces differences in parties' positions across many issues to differences on that dimension. To take one common example, the Left-Right dimension simplifies differences in parties' positions on a variety of socioeconomic issues into differences along a single dimension. As a result, if one can identify the relationship between specific policies and the underlying dimensions, then one can infer parties' positions on individual policies from their positions on the underlying dimensions (Gabel & Huber, 2000, p. 95) .
Each of the aforementioned models of the EU political space specifies a distinct dimensionality to the EU political space. To examine their accuracy, we need information about the positions of relevant political actors on a variety of EU political issues. In the national context, a common source of such information would be party manifestos, which present parties' promises and positions regarding a vast array of issues (see especially ). Since national parties compete for office and adopt policies, these actors'policy positions are an obvious object of study for defining the national political space. However, in the EU context, no comparable source of data exists. There are no elections determining control of EU governance that are contested by political parties who issue manifestos detailing their positions on a broad array of EU issues.
1 But there is one source of data that offers a reasonable approximation: the manifestos of the Euro-parties.
DATA: THE EURO-PARTIES' ELECTION MANIFESTOS, 1979-1999
Euro-parties are federations of national parties that organize according to political family into the following groups: Socialist, Christian Democrat/ Conservative, Liberal, and Green. Like their constituent national parties, the Euro-parties have their own administrative organization, budget, and secretariat (Hix & Lord, 1997, p. 63) . The Euro-parties are active in setting and coordinating the EU policy agenda for their members. In addition, party leaders' meetings-which include national party leaders, European commissioners, and party group leaders in the European Parliament (EP) from the same party family-help coordinate policy positions and proposals across different EU policy-making institutions (Hix & Lord, 1997, p. 64) . Hix and Lord (1997) argue that these Euro-parties serve as effective umbrella organizations for structuring the policy agendas of their members in EU policy making. Thus, whereas representatives of national parties are the primary actors in EU policy making (in the Council of Ministers and the EP), their behavior is structured by the overarching Euro-parties.
These Euro-parties state their positions publicly in manifestos that are adopted immediately before the elections for the EP (which have been held every 5 years since 1979). Specifically, we collected, coded, and analyzed the manifestos of the Socialist, Christian Democrat/Conservative, Liberal, and Green Euro-parties. We then used this information about Euro-party policy positions to examine the aforementioned models of the EU political space.
These manifestos are a valuable source of information about the EU policy space for several reasons. First, these documents are a reasonably accurate statement of the positions that the European political elites take on issues on the EU agenda at different points in time. Granted, these documents are rarely used in the parties' election campaigns in the domestic arena and are not well known by European citizens. However, the domestic media like to point out the inconsistencies between the commitments made by national party leaders in these European manifestos and those made in their national party programs or manifestos. Consequently, to monitor commitments made at the European level, national party leaders have gradually delegated increasingly senior party officials to the task of negotiating these documents.
For example, in 1998, the British Labour Party sent its foreign minister, Robin Cook, to lead the working group drafting the European Socialist Party family's manifesto for the 1999 European elections. Similarly high-ranking figures were sent by the French, German, and Italian Socialist Parties, all of whom were in government in the domestic arena at the time. And once these negotiations are complete, the manifestos are signed at the highest political level, by the national party leaders. These signatories are the key political actors in the EU system: competing for the highest offices in the domestic arena and scrutinizing the behavior of their representative in the EU institutionsministers in the council, commissioners, and the national delegations of the parties in the EP.
Second, since their emergence around the first EP elections in the mid1970s, the member parties of the four transnational party federations in our analysis have dominated politics in the EU (Hix, 1996; Hix & Lord, 1997, pp. 30-39, 167-197) . The Party of European Socialists (PES) incorporates the major party on the Center-Left in every EU member state, who together receive the support of about 30% of voters in the EU. And at the time of writing (November 2001), they made up 181 of the 626 seats in the EP, 10 of the 20 commissioners, and 10 of the 15 EU prime ministers and were in government in 11 of the 15 EU states (see http://www.eurosocialists.org).
The European People's Party (EPP) involves 23 national Christian Democratic and Conservative Parties, who together incorporate the main CenterRight party in every EU state except Ireland (Fianna Fail). These parties command the support of approximately 30% of voters in the EU; at the time of writing, EPP politicians made up 232 of the 626 seats in the EP, 6 of the 20 commissioners, and 4 of the 15 EU prime ministers and were in government in 5 of the 15 EU states (see http://www.eppe.org/home/default.asp).
The European Liberal, Democrat, and Reform Party (ELDR) incorporates 18 liberal, centrist, reform, radical, and agrarian parties and the ELDR group in the EP. In the mid-1990s, the ELDR lost two of its most influential parties to the EPP: the Portuguese Social Democrats and the French Republicans. Nevertheless, the ELDR remains present in every EU state, and these parties command the support of approximately 10% of voters in the EU; at the time of writing, ELDR politicians made up 51 of the 626 seats in the EP, 2 of the 20 commissioners, and 1 of the 15 EU prime ministers and were in government in 8 of the 15 EU states (see http://www.eldr.org).
Finally, the European Federation of Green Parties (EFGP) incorporates 18 environmentalist, ecologist, and Green-Left parties and the Green members of the Green/European Free Alliance group in the EP. These parties command the support of approximately 5% of voters in the EU; at the time of writing, EFGP politicians made up 38 of the 626 seats in the EP, 1 of the 20 commissioners, and 1 of the EU foreign ministers (from Germany) and were in government in 4 of the 15 EU states (see http://www.europeangreens.org).
Overall, these four Euro-parties dominate politics at the national and European levels in the EU, commanding the support of more than 75% of voters and controlling more than 80% of seats in the EP, 100% of EU commissioners, more than 90% of EU prime ministers, and more than 85% of parties in government. Hence, if we look at how these parties position themselves against each other in their manifestos for European elections, we can gain a fairly accurate picture of the terrain of politics in, and relating to, the EU.
CODING AND MEASUREMENT: FROM MANIFESTO PROMISES TO POLICY LOCATIONS
The EPP, PES, and ELDR have adopted manifestos in every European election since 1979, whereas the EFGP has adopted manifestos only since the 1989 elections. This leads to 18 Euro-party manifestos in total-3 from the 1979 and 1984 elections and 4 from the 1989, 1994, and 1999 elections.
To convert these texts into numerical data for analysis, we used a standard content analysis technique that has been widely used to examine national party manifestos (Budge et al., 1987b ). This technique involves the following steps. First, we draw up a coding frame, which is set out in the appendix. Our coding frame is based on Michael Laver's reformed version of the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) Party Manifestos project coding frame (Laver, 2001; Laver & Garry, 2000) . This scheme differs from the ECPR scheme in three ways. First, it is more hierarchical than the ECPR scheme, which allows for categories to be amalgamated more systematically. Second, the scheme includes exclusively directional categories. The ECPR scheme also included categories that were simply designed to tap issue saliency-for example, the category "free enterprise"-without any clear directional character to the category. As we are interested in the relative posi-tions of Euro-parties on each issue rather than the relative saliency, this coding is appropriate to our analysis. Third, to Laver's scheme we add a whole new set of issue categories (categories beginning with the number 6), relating to positions on the general question of European integration, specific views of the EU institutions and EU policies, and a number of general issues on the EU agenda. Second, each document is then coded, using the same content-analysis technique as that used in the ECPR Party Manifestos project (Budge et al., 2001, pp. 215-218; Budge, Robertson, & Hearl, 1987a) . This process involves coding every statement (sentence or part sentence) in each manifesto for one and only one of the issue categories in the coding frame. From these raw scores, we then calculate the proportion (percentage) of sentences in each document dedicated to each policy category. These percentages are the data we use in the analysis. 2 For example, if a manifesto contains 2 sentences stating that the party supports the EU single market, followed by 1 statement qualifying this support (for example, by criticizing the failure of the EU to complete the single market effectively), the 1st two sentences are coded as "support for the EU single market" (Category 63121), and the 3rd sentence is coded as "criticism of the EU single market" (Category 63123). Then, if the manifesto contains 100 statements and there are no other references to the single market in the document, the proportional score for Category 63121 is 2.0%, and the proportional score for Category 63123 is 1.0%.
The result is a valuable data set that could have a number of applications in the study of EU politics. To give the reader an idea of the extent of this data set, Table 1 shows the number of political statements (raw scores) in each manifesto. As the table shows, the EPP tended to issue shorter manifestos than the other parties. However, this does not bias the results. The EPP manifestos covered as many issues as the other parties' manifestos, simply in less depth. And because we are interested in the proportion of the manifesto dedicated to each issue category rather than the absolute raw scores, the length of the manifesto is irrelevant for our analysis.
Third, to create a smaller number of variables for statistical analysis, we combined the percentage scores into a number of consolidated issue catego-2. One potential problem with this coding method is that by using percentages of total statements, the percentages in each category are not independent. However, since manifestos varysometimes dramatically-in length, we need to adjust the categories to control for the level of verbosity in each text. We should also note that this coding method has proved effective in identifying the dimensionality of the political space in the national context (e.g., Gabel & Huber, 2000) .
ries.
3 These categories are designed to both capture the breadth of the content in the manifestos and allow us to differentiate among the empirical claims of the theoretical models of the EU political space discussed earlier.
We focus on these categories because they involve issues of both EU policy and EU integration, which are the issues hypothesized to characterize the EU political space. Note that each category has a directional opposite, which is necessary for coding purposes.
4 Consistent with this expectation, these categories represent, on average, about 72% of all statements in a manifesto. 3. Due to low levels of covariation across many of the categories, it was difficult to identify the confirmatory factor analysis models estimated here. Also, given the empirical implications of the models of the EU political space, we needed to create supercategories consistent with the hypothesized policy areas.
6. anti-Democratic EU institutional reform (62313, 62323, 62333, 6423, 6433, 6443, 64723, 64733, 64743, 64753, 6493, 62511, 62523, 63321, 62613, 6132) , 7. pro-new EU regulatory/redistributive policies (63111, 63131, 63141, 63343, 63251, 63333, 63361, 63371, 63431) , 8. anti-new EU regulatory/redistributive policies (63113, 63133, 63143, 63341, 63253, 63331, 63363, 63373, 63433) , 9. pro-EU enlargement (64101), 10. anti-EU enlargement (64103), 11. pro-EU economic integration (63121, 63311, 63221, 63161, 63411, 6111) , 12. anti-EU economic integration (63123, 63313, 63223, 63163, 63413, 6131) , 13. pro-new EU political integration (63511, 63521, 63611, 63621, 63631, 63641, 63651) , and 14. anti-new EU political integration (63513, 63523, 63613, 63623, 63633, 63643, 63653) .
Some of these categories deserve further discussion. The categories concerning institutional reform of the EU (Numbers 5 and 6) include statements regarding (a) strengthening the European Parliament vis-à-vis other EU institutions, (b) increased transparency and reduction in the democratic deficit, and (c) increased interest representation in the EU. The categories concerning new EU regulatory/redistributive policies include statements about new policies that have a specific expected policy outcome. Policy outcomes that involved regulation of business or the economy or that generally favored labor at the expense of capital were coded as pro. For example, support for more EU regulation of the economy or environment was coded pro in this category. A statement supporting the single goal of price stability was coded as anti. The categories for EU economic integration include statements referring to the fundamental economic components of EU membership: the internal market, competition policy, common external trade policy, and common agricultural policy. The categories for new EU political integration include statements referring to further policy integration, with no policy outcome specified. For example, a statement in support of common immigration policies does not specify whether that policy would be restrictive or liberal. Table 2 presents the proportion of all parties' manifesto commitments in each election dedicated to these consolidated issue categories. Together, these issue categories consume more than 60% of the Euro-parties' manifestos in this period. Furthermore, most of these categories had broadly the same level of saliency across each election. The few exceptions are easily explainable. For example, pro-new EU regulatory/redistributive policies were highly salient in the 1989 election following the delegation of new regulatory competences to the EU level in the 1987 Single European Act, which included the program to complete the EU single market by the end of 1992. Conversely, the issue of EU enlargement (either pro or anti) was not very salient in the 1989 election, because following the membership of Spain and Portugal in 1986, it was clear that the next round of enlargement (which did not come until 1995) was several years away.
Finally, Table 3 presents the correlation matrix for these 12 variables. Note that with only 18 observations, many correlations are insignificant at standard levels of statistical significance.
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS METHOD
To test the rival models of the shape of the EU political space in statistical analysis, we use confirmatory factor analysis of these 14 issue categories. Factor analysis examines how the covariation among manifesto emphases 942 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / October 2002 . Confirmatory factor analysis evaluates the performance of a particular factor structure in explaining the covariation among these parties' emphases across policy categories. The factor structure specifies the number of factors, their interrelationships, and their relationships to the categories, which serve as indicators of the factors. The performance of the factor structure is evaluated through a measurement model that assesses the fit of the structure with the data. Note that we estimate the measurement models with the full set of manifestos data for all five European elections. With all manifestos included, we have 18 observations (manifestos) for each policy category, which is a very small number for estimation purposes. We therefore cannot estimate measurement models for subsets of the data by year or by party federation.
The four models predict different factor structures for the covariation in the issue category variables:
1. International relations model: All variables should load on one factor (dimension), which will be identified by the variables measuring European integration (Numbers 5 to 14). For these variables, the parameter estimates for the pro variables should be in the same direction (positive or negative), with the parameter estimates for the anti variables sharing the opposite direction. tions. This would result in a policy space where basically two camps compete: those supporting regulated capitalism and those supporting neoliberalism at the EU level. Table 4 presents the maximum likelihood results from the three measurement models designed to evaluate the aforementioned models of the EU political space. We report the standardized coefficients for these models as well as several measures of model fit. As recommended by Hoyle and Panter (1995) , we report the following fit indices: the goodness-of-fit index (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1981) , the non-normed fit index (Bentler & Bonnett, 1980) , the incremental fit index (Bollen, 1989) , and the comparative fit index (Bentler, 1990) . The values of the goodness-of-fit index, non-normed fit index, incremental fit index, and comparative fit index range from 0 to 1.0, with higher values indicating better model fit (Bentler & Bonnett, 1980; Hoyle & Panter, 1995) . Note that for all of the models, the model fit is objectively small. This may indicate that we have not specified the correct model for capturing the policy space. Alternatively, there may be very little underlying structure to the positions of the party groups on these issues, as the low correlations between many policy areas suggest (see Table 3 ). At any rate, we will focus on the relative level of model fit for each theoretical model.
RESULTS
The first model assumes one factor underlies all 14 categories. For the nonintegration variables (1 through 4), opposing categories load on this dimension in opposite directions (one positive, one negative). This is not true for the integration variables. Of these, only the variables for new political integration and economic integration load in opposing directions by topic (and only the economic variables are both significant). The basic interpretation of the dimension is that parties that are antiregulation in general express traditional values and support new political integration but also support economic integration. Note that parties that are against new EU regulatory policies are for economic integration and new EU political integration.
These results are inconsistent with the international relations model, as the integration variables do not load consistently with expectations. The results are roughly consistent with the regulation model, as the traditional Left-Right variables load consistently with expectations and the antistate/-intervention and the anti-new EU regulatory policies variables load in the same direction. Thus, of the one-factor conceptual models, the regulation model performs best.
Model 2 presents a two-factor model designed to test the Hix-Lord model. The results are consistent with expectations on the Left-Right dimension (Factor 1). However, on the national sovereignty dimension (Factor 2), the loadings are not clearly indicative of a pro-/anti-integration dimension. The loadings indicate that parties that are antienlargement are also anti-new EU regulatory policies and anti-EU democratic reform. But these parties would be favorable to new political integration. In addition, this factor does not account for parties' positions on EU economic integration. It is also important to note that the goodness of fit of this model is generally inferior to that of the one-factor model presented in Model 1.
Model 3 attempts to capture the specifications of the Hooghe-Marks model by relaxing the assumption of orthogonality. In terms of interpretation, the factor loadings in this model are basically the same as those in Model 2. The interfactor correlation is quite high (-.838), suggesting that these two dimensions are strongly related. The factors interrelate such that positions that are pro-state intervention and anti-traditional values on the first dimension are negatively related to anti-EU democratic reform positions and antinew EU regulatory policy positions on the second dimension. This is consistent with expectations, representing a regulated capitalism camp. However, these same Left positions on the first dimensions are negatively related to pro-EU political integration positions and have an ambiguous relationship to positions on EU economic integration. This is inconsistent with a regulated capitalism agenda. As for the neoliberalism camp, there is some supporting evidence. Positions against state intervention were positively related to positions opposed to EU democratic reform and new EU regulatory/redistributive policies. But these Right positions on the first dimension were positively related to positions favoring new EU political integration. This is not consistent with a neoliberalism agenda. One reason for the unexpected results regarding positions on new EU political integration is that these categories did not specify the direction of policy in a proposed area of new EU authority. Support for new political integration simply indicated that a manifesto supported the extension of EU authority to a new policy area-irrespective of whether that policy might be consistent with a Left or Right ideological position. Thus, the relationship between the Left-Right dimension and these positions is not particularly important for the Hooghe-Marks model. The more important categories are those regarding institutional reform and regulation of the EU market. For those categories, the model performs generally as expected. Consequently, we find the results, on balance, to support the Hooghe-Marks model.
The model fit for Model 3 is an improvement on Model 2 but not clearly better than that of Model 1. The Bentler-Bonnett non-normed fit index (Bentler & Bonnett, 1980 ) is smaller for Model 3 than for Model 1 whereas the other goodness-of-fit measures favor Model 3 slightly over Model 1. Thus, particularly with the high factor correlation in Model 3, we cannot conclude that the Hooghe-Marks model is a better representation of the EU policy space than the one-factor model. Our interpretation of these results is that the policy space is basically one dimensional, consistent with the regulation model, where European economic integration represents an antiregulation enterprise. That is, Euro-parties that are against state intervention in the economy are also for economic integration in the EU. Certainly, there is evidence that this space has a multidimensional character and is basically consistent with the Hooghe-Marks model, but the correlation between these dimensions is very high.
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS METHOD
Finally, we also used these manifestos data to evaluate how the parties differentiate themselves from each other and over time in the policy areas and whether this is in accordance with the expectations of the four models of the EU political space. As mentioned above, for the confirmatory factor analysis, we did not have sufficient degrees of freedom to examine temporal dynamics of the EU policy space or Euro-party policy positions. However, we can give some descriptive account of these changes by simply tracking Euro-party policy positions in particular areas over time.
We use the raw score data from the manifestos to calculate the location of the parties in each election in different policy areas. Following the ECPR Party Manifestos project method, the location of a party on a particular issue is the proportion (percentage) of a manifesto dedicated to one side of the issue minus the proportion dedicated to the other side of the issue (Budge, 2001; ). For example, if a manifesto contains 10% of pro-state/-economic intervention statements and 5% of antistate/-economic intervention statements, the manifesto is located at +5.0 on the state/ economic intervention dimension. Figure 1 shows that the Euro-parties were relatively distinct on economic Left-Right issues (see Figure 1A) . The Socialists moved dramatically to the Right in the 1980s and came close to the positions of the EPP and the Liberals in the 1989 election. But in 1994 and 1999, the Socialists again presented a distinct Center-Left agenda. The EPP (which at that time had few explicitly conservative member parties) also moved from a more centrist economic agenda in the late 1970s-to the Left of the Liberals-to a clear free-market agenda in the late 1990s, very close to the position of the Liberals. Also, the EFGP party emerged as a new force-clearly to the Left of the Socialists in the 1999 election. The results consequently support the Hix-Lord, HoogheMarks, and regulation claims about party distinction on economic issues relating to the traditional Left-Right conflict.
RESULTS
On European integration issues, Figure 1B shows that the positions of the two main parties have almost completely reversed. At the end of the 1970s and in the early 1980s, the EPP was generally prointegration, whereas the Socialists were generally more skeptical. Conversely, at the end of the 1990s, the Socialists were the main champions of economic integration and the EPP is one of the more skeptical forces. In between, the Liberals followed the EPP on issues of EU economic integration. And the Greens emerged as the only anti-integrationist force at the European level. Since the parties crossed paths on many of these issue dimensions, the results refute the claims of all the models that parties maintain clear and distinct positions on European integration issues. However, if we map the party positions at the beginning and end of the period in a two-dimensional space, we can modify this conclusion. As Figure  2 shows, across the whole period, as the Hix-Lord model predicts, all four positions were present: Left/anti-integration (Socialists in 1979 and Greens in 1999) , Left/prointegration (Socialists in 1999) , Right/anti-integration (EPP and Liberals in 1999) , and Right/prointegration (Liberals and EPP in 1979) .
As a result, the Hooghe-Marks claim about the relationship between the two dimensions does not hold in 1979: where the Center-Left PES was more anti-European than both the EPP and ELDR. But their claims do hold in 1999. The Socialists became more pro-European as they began to endorse regulatory capitalism at the European and national levels (instead of welfare capitalism at the domestic level). On the other side, the EPP became more anti-European as they began to advocate neoliberal economic policies, and the already neoliberal ELDR became more anti-European as the EU became more regulatory.
Nevertheless, the regulation prediction that the party line-up on the economic Left-Right should map directly onto the pro-/anti-Europe dimension does not hold. In 1979, whereas it was PES-EPP-ELDR on the Left-Right, it was the reverse (ELDR-EPP-PES) from prointegration to anti-integration. In other words, at the beginning of the period, the correlation between the directions was in the opposite direction to the regulation prediction: with the Left mapping onto anti-Europe and the Right mapping onto pro-Europe. The predictions were closer in 1999-where it was PES versus EPP/ELDR from Left to Right and PES versus ELDR/EPP from prointegration to anti-integration. But this holds only if the Greens are excluded as outliers (perhaps on the grounds that they are weaker at the European level than the other party families), and the Liberals, Conservatives, and Christian Democrats are treated as a single Center-Right bloc.
CONCLUSION
As have Gabel and Anderson (2002 [this issue] ) and Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson (2002 [this issue ]), we have explored empirically whether political agents take positions on EU policy that are structured by ideological dimensions that define a coherent EU policy space. We have focused on the policy positions of Euro-parties as presented in their electoral manifestos. Our results indicate that the positions of these parties are interpretable through the lens of existing models of the policy space.
First of all, the manifestos data reveal that the Euro-parties have differentiated themselves on some major policy issues, but this differentiation is not simply a copy of the domestic, ideological, "family" distinctions between Socialists, Christian Democrats/Conservatives, and Liberals. On economic issues on the EU agenda and relating to European integration, Euro-parties consisting of national parties on the domestic ideological Left or Right took positions that were distinct and consistent with these ideological positions. But on the questions of the speed and nature of economic integration in Europe (such as what powers should be delegated to the European level), the Euro-parties were less consistent in how they differentiated themselves from one another in the positions they took. In fact, across the 20-year period, the Left and Right parties swapped positions on the question of European integration: with the Socialists moving from being the least prointegration party to being the most prointegration party and the Christian Democrats/Conservatives moving in the reverse direction.
As a result, if the 20-year period is taken as a whole, the Hix-Lord model of a two-dimensional political space appears the most appropriate of the extant models. According to this model, the Left-Right and EU integration dimensions are orthogonal, which produces four distinct and enduring positions in the space. Alternatively, one could argue that the Hooghe-Marks or the regulation model captures the evolution from a two-dimensional space to a new one-dimensional space: between a regulatory capitalist position (on the Left and prointegration) and a neoliberal position (on the Right and less prointegration). From the Hix-Lord perspective, though, this new structure is only temporary, as Left/anti-integration and Right/prointegration positions are sure to emerge at some point in the future.
Second, the results of the confirmatory factor analyses provide systematic empirical evidence as to the accuracy of four prominent models of the EU political space. Interestingly, arguably the most common model-the international relations model-is inconsistent with the pattern of policy positions adopted by Euro-parties in their election manifestos. In addition, the evidence provides only modest support for the Hix-Lord model and the HoogheMarks model. Instead, the Euro-parties, to the extent that they structure their policy positions, appear to structure their policy space more in terms of traditional socioeconomic Left-Right-that is, the regulation model. The best performing model was one in which the traditional socioeconomic LeftRight determined the positions of the Euro-parties on EU socioeconomic policies and on issues relating to further economic integration in Europe. But a related yet distinct dimension structures issues of further political integration, new EU roles in regulating the economy, and EU territorial enlargement. However, given the strong relationship between these two dimensions, for practical purposes we would conclude that the single dimensional model is a reasonable depiction of the EU and a reasonable assumption for spatial modeling. That single dimension would best be characterized as reflecting a traditional socioeconomic Left-Right dimension.
This political space is roughly consistent with the mass-level political space identified by Gabel and Anderson (2002) . One interesting implication of this congruence is that transnational party groups appear to be organizing their policy positions in a fashion generally similar to that of the voters they ultimately represent. Although it is clear from studies of European elections (e.g., Van Der Eijk & Franklin, 1996 ) that this congruence is not due to voters' choosing parties based on their concerns about EU policy, the coincidence of these political spaces is striking. Among other things, it indicates that were transnational party groups to supplant national parties as the primary contestants in European elections, voters and party groups would have a common shorthand language to communicate about policy. This would facilitate representation and democratic accountability, as discussed in Gabel and Anderson (2002) .
We should emphasize that we consider these conclusions as tentative. While the Euro-party manifestos data are valuable as a source of information about relevant political actors'positions on EU policy, they have some limitations. First, not all political actors involved in EU policy making are members of Euro-parties. In particular, those actors (e.g., political parties) with policy positions outside the mainstream of the traditional party families were ignored in our analysis. To the extent that these actors are important to EU policy making and take considerably different positions on EU policy from those of the Euro-parties, our results will misrepresent the EU policy space. However, as we argued above, most of the key players in EU politics are members of these Euro-parties.
Second, and possibly of greater concern, the Euro-parties may have significant internal conflict over EU policies, yet they must write a common manifesto. Such internal dissent could result in manifestos that avoid sensitive issues or ones that are ambivalent. For example, if all Euro-parties suffer from an internal division over further institutional and territorial integration of Europe, then this integration dimension of conflict may simply be ignored in the Euro-party manifestos. If this concern about integration is an important determinant of national parties' behavior in EU policy making, our analysis would fail to capture this dimension of the EU policy space (Hix, 1999) .
Put more generally, this problem is important for our results if (a) national parties largely act independently of their Euro-parties when they participate in EU policy making and (b) national parties within Euro-parties are divided on important issues of EU policy. We can only speculate on the likelihood that either of these conditions accurately describes EU politics. As we argued above, Euro-parties appear to influence the behavior of their members and to shape the agenda of EU politics. Also, the Euro-parties are not simply arbitrary groupings of national parties. The Euro-parties consist of parties with similar constituencies and ideological/policy concerns. However, to the extent that national parties pursue policy agendas distinct from their party federations, the results of our analysis may mischaracterize the dimensionality of the EU political space. But lacking an alternative and better source of data about national parties' positions on EU policies, we hope that the results reported here provide some empirical guidance on how to describe and model EU politics. 3131 traditional sexual values (e.g., gay rights, proabortion)
